The Federal Reserve is conducting its first systematic assessment of the impact of payment stablecoins, noting that they can improve cross-border efficiency while also reshaping the space for reserve flows and monetary policy operations.
Three economists at the Federal Reserve (Fed)—Kyungmin Kim, Romina Ruprecht, and Mary-Frances Styczynski—published a research note on March 30 on the Fed’s official website titled “Payment Stablecoins and Cross-Border Payments: Benefits and Implications for Monetary Policy Implementation.” This marks the Fed’s first comprehensive analysis of the overall economic effects of stablecoins following the passage of the GENIUS Act in July 2025.
The study first clarifies the regulatory background: in July 2025, the U.S. Congress passed the GENIUS Act, establishing a regulatory framework for payment stablecoins. Under the law, stablecoin issuers must comply with the following core requirements:
The study indicates that subsequent implementation details from federal and state regulators will determine the actual scale of stablecoin adoption among wholesale and retail customers.
The core issue the study focuses on is: where exactly does the inefficiency in the current cross-border payment system originate?
The answer is the correspondent banking intermediary chain. Because cross-border payments involve high fixed costs—such as establishing overseas branches and building AML/KYC compliance capabilities—only large international banks can afford it. Smaller and medium-sized banks must route payments through this chain, leading to:
The situation is worsening. According to SWIFT data, over 60% of wholesale payments require at least one intermediary; over the past decade, the number of active correspondent banks has decreased by about 30%. Market concentration has increased, and a few large banks may extract economic rents through high fees or outdated infrastructure.
The study envisions a scenario where stablecoin-driven cross-border payments occur: individuals, businesses, and small to medium banks conduct cross-border transfers directly using dollar-pegged stablecoins, while large international banks act as market makers, trading stablecoins to maintain liquidity. This structure can:
The study also notes that because holding dollar assets abroad inherently involves exchange rate and geopolitical risks, the analysis focuses on “local currency economies with stablecoin value,” and does not discuss the potential of dollar stablecoins as a store of value offshore.
The most critical finding of the study is that the impact of stablecoins on the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet largely depends on the asset management strategies of the issuers. The study considers three scenarios:
The common conclusion across all three scenarios is that once stablecoins are adopted at a large scale, the Fed may need to recalibrate its reserve management policies to respond to potentially large and rapid fund flows between banks and stablecoin issuers.
The timing of this research note’s release is noteworthy—coming as the U.S. Congress is actively advancing stablecoin legislation and as markets closely monitor the progress of the GENIUS Act’s implementation. The analysis by Fed economists represents the first systematic assessment at the central bank level: stablecoins are not just payment tools but a structural variable that could alter the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
For the crypto industry, this study affirms the efficiency advantages of stablecoins in cross-border payments, while also clearly indicating that larger scale will deepen the impact on traditional financial systems and lead regulators to scrutinize asset management structures more strictly.