2025-12-12 22:21:28

From the perspective of Occam's Razor, the security incident involving the Shib cross-chain bridge: out of 12 validators, 10 "signed" malicious transactions. The most straightforward explanation is that the signing keys of the validators have been compromised.

This means the attacker either directly obtained the validators' private signing keys or controlled the systems capable of using these keys — possibly through intrusion into developers' local machines or lateral breaches of key management and identity verification systems like KMS/IAM.

This type of event reminds us that in the security model of cross-chain bridges, key management of validator groups is crucial. Once there is a vulnerability in the permission system, the entire validation mechanism becomes invalid.

SHIB-1.22%

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LayerZeroHero

· 12-12 22:51

10 validators going down together? Key management really can't have any slack at all --- It's the same old trick of key leaks. Why do cross-chain bridges keep failing at this point? --- It doesn't seem like a technical problem at all, just permissions management being too lax --- What does the Shib incident this time tell us? One slack link and the whole system fails --- Wait, if KMS can be breached laterally, then is it really safe? --- Occam's Razor: the moment you cut it, the key is compromised. There's nothing to argue about --- The eternal pain point of cross-chain bridges—validator key management really needs to be taken seriously --- Out of 12, 10 sign malicious transactions. What does this probability tell us...? --- So the key issue is that the infrastructure wasn't properly built; relying solely on validators can't hold up

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NoodlesOrTokens

· 12-12 22:50

My private key was compromised, I really can't handle this anymore. How come there are still so many projects willing to use this kind of verification method? --- 10 validators all compromised at once, what does that mean? It means the key management is completely neglected. --- Every time a cross-chain bridge has a problem, it's the fault of the keys. Can't you learn? --- That's why I don't touch certain bridges. Their permission systems are so fragile, who would dare to use them? --- Occam's Razor: the simplest answer is often the correct one. If the key is broken, it's over. --- Developer's local machine gets hacked? Then how come KMS didn't prevent it? How strong is that line of defense? --- If the validator cluster's key management is poorly handled, no matter how many validators there are, it's all useless.

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ImpermanentPhilosopher

· 12-12 22:49

10 validators going down at the same time, this is not a coincidence, it's just a direct blow-through Key management is really a weak point, cross-chain bridges will never escape this fate KMS defense lines are basically useless? Need to think about whether an inside job has compromised any link Another bridge accident scene, when can we finally achieve real security That's why I still believe that cross-chain transactions always carry more risk than reward Once the key is leaked, it's basically game over; no matter how many validators there are, it's useless Feels like this kind of incident happens every now and then, when will it ever end

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AirdropFatigue

· 12-12 22:31

10 validators falling together, how bad is that... Key management is indeed the Achilles' heel of cross-chain bridges. --- Again, key leaks and system lateral breaches, this combination directly cripples the entire validation mechanism. --- To put it simply, the Shib incident was a fatal vulnerability in permission management; breaking one link means losing everything. --- Validator cluster key management really needs to be a matter of life and death, otherwise cross-chain bridges have no defenses. --- 12 out of 10 were compromised? How fragile must the security defenses be if even developers' local machines can be invaded to connect so many systems. --- Occam's Razor is used well; the simplest explanation is often the correct one—someone stole the keys. --- Lateral breaches of KMS are a critical flaw. If this type of key management system truly falls, no matter how many validators there are, it's useless.

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