$TBC

TBC (Turing Bit Chain)
Is the security dilemma of DeFi only able to be compromised by "unlimited authorization" and "trusting third parties"?
Project Updates
When Ethereum users lose all their assets due to clicking a phishing link, and when a contract vulnerability in Solana causes both project parties and users to suffer significant losses, we must reflect: Is the prosperity of DeFi built on a fragile security foundation? According to the 2024 On-Chain Security Report, asset losses due to authorization vulnerabilities reached up to $2.3 billion that year, with over 60% of cases stemming from the abuse of "unlimited authorization." Even more concerning is that the architectural characteristics of traditional account model blockchains (such as Ethereum and BSC) make it nearly impossible to eliminate this risk—whenever users need to interact with DApps, they must temporarily or permanently grant asset operational rights to third-party contracts. But the question is: Are we really left with no choice but to pick between "convenience" and "security"?
The UTXO model of the TBC public chain provides a completely different answer. It reconstructs the logic of asset interaction from the ground up: each transaction is an independent and self-contained "digital cash" flow, allowing users to operate assets without granting approval to any third party. This design is rooted in Bitcoin's core philosophy—"your private key, your assets"—but TBC has adapted it to meet the complex demands of modern DeFi through technological upgrades. For instance, its 4GB large block architecture supports processing tens of thousands of UTXO transactions per second, effectively solving the throughput bottleneck that the Bitcoin ecosystem has long faced; while future atomic swap protocols will enable trustless cross-chain interactions with multi-chain assets (such as BTC), allowing users to participate in the TBC ecosystem without having to entrust their assets to a centralized bridge. This means that, from a technical perspective, TBC retains the security advantage of the UTXO model's "no authorization risk" while enhancing its performance and cross-chain capabilities, enabling it to support high-frequency and diverse DeFi application scenarios.
Based on this architecture, DeFi applications on TBC exhibit security characteristics that are fundamentally different from traditional ecosystems. Take decentralized exchanges as an example: users do not need to authorize the platform to operate their wallet assets during transactions; instead, they complete the "money goods two ends" directly through the atomic swap feature of UTXO. Even if there are vulnerabilities in the platform's contracts, hackers cannot steal assets that users have not actively signed transactions for. The same goes for lending protocols—assets pledged by users are always controlled by themselves and are automatically executed through pre-signed transactions only when liquidation conditions are met, rather than handing over asset operational rights to the contract in advance. Even NFT transactions have achieved true "payment on delivery": ownership of the NFT is transferred through a single UTXO at the same time the buyer makes the payment, with both parties not needing to trust the platform intermediary. The common point of these scenarios is that security no longer relies on "trust" in third parties, but rather achieves "trustless" inherent security through architectural design.
What deserves more attention is that the UTXO model of TBC is driving a "paradigm shift in security." The traditional DeFi security approach is "vulnerability fixing" and "audit reliance"—project teams need to continuously patch contract vulnerabilities, and users need to be constantly vigilant about authorization risks. In contrast, TBC's approach is "architecture immunity"—eliminating the need for authorization at the base level, so that most attack vectors do not exist at all. For example:
No phishing attack risk: Since there are no approve transactions, hackers cannot forge authorization pages to deceive permissions;
No contract vulnerability theft: Even if the contract written by the developer has oversights, hackers cannot directly transfer user assets;
No unlimited authorization abuse: Users cannot set "unlimited limits" at all, and all transactions must be explicitly signed.
This transformation not only reduces users' security anxiety but also liberates developers' creativity—they no longer have to spend a lot of effort designing complex permission management logic, but can instead focus on product experience and innovation.
From the perspective of ecological data, this model has been preliminarily validated; user research shows that over 80% of migrating users indicate that "the lack of authorization risk" is the main reason for choosing TBC. In the future, with the improvement of cross-chain technology (such as direct support for BTC and ETH assets participating in DeFi), the upgrade of privacy features (such as zk-UTXO transactions), and the introduction of institutional-grade tools (such as compliant KYC solutions), TBC is expected to become the preferred choice for security-sensitive users and institutions.
The security dilemma of DeFi has never been an unsolvable problem—it's just that we need to break free from the "account model" mindset. The TBC public chain proves that by combining the UTXO model with innovative technology, we can indeed build a DeFi ecosystem that is both secure and efficient: here, users do not have to compromise between convenience and security, and developers do not need to weigh functionality against risk. Perhaps this is how blockchain should be: technology serving people, rather than people adapting to the flaws of technology. Choosing TBC means choosing a simpler and safer DeFi future—where asset security is not a luxury, but a default state.