From the top 2% of the year to the bottom of the year: Founder Fubon Xin Hong's "Profit and Loss Share" dilemma and investment warnings

Just look at the Golden Qilin analyst reports for stock trading—they’re authoritative, professional, timely, and comprehensive, helping you uncover potential thematic opportunities!

Source: Bread Finance

Doubling in 2025, plummeting 22.11% since 2026, with long-term losses exceeding 8% since inception, and a maximum drawdown of nearly 70%—the Founder Fubon Xinhong A has illustrated the market rule of “profit and loss share the same source” through extreme performance. This flexible allocation fund stood out in the 2025 tech bull market with its high turnover and concentrated track betting strategy, but its strategic weaknesses were exposed during the market shift in 2026.

This is not just the fluctuation of an ordinary fund—it’s a profound lesson about “track faith” and “lack of risk control.”

Six years in: A “gamble-style” performance roller coaster

Founded on July 26, 2019, the performance benchmark of Founder Fubon Xinhong A is the Shanghai and Shenzhen 300 Index return × 70% + the China Bond Index return × 30%—from its positioning, it was supposed to be a flexible allocation fund that balanced equities and bonds and was relatively stable, but its actual performance took an “extremely aggressive” curve.

As of March 25, 2026 (same below), this fund has been established for over six years, with cumulative returns still down about 8.16%, and the maximum drawdown during this period approached 70%, making it a typical representative of “roller coaster-style” performance.

Looking back at the performance trajectory over these six years, three distinctly different phases can be clearly observed:

• 2019-2024: Continuous stagnation, repeatedly hitting pitfalls. The performance in 2020 was decent, but from 2021 to 2024, it lagged significantly behind the benchmark and peers for four consecutive years, especially in 2022 with a plunge of 39.11%, nearly at the bottom compared to peers.

• 2025: A gamble pays off, doubling in one go. In this year, Founder Fubon Xinhong experienced a “comeback,” with net value surging 99.27%, ranking among the top 2 in its category. The underlying logic was a “gamble-style” bet—the fund heavily invested in the robotics industry chain, just in time for the AI and humanoid robot themes to explode, capitalizing on the windfall. However, this “single-point betting” model inevitably comes with high risk: when the trend recedes, the net value will inevitably see a significant correction.

• 2026 to present: The trend recedes, and the drawdown intensifies. With the heat of the robotics theme fading, related stocks sharply corrected, and the fund failed to reduce its positions in time, resulting in a continuous decline in net value. As of March 25, Founder Fubon Xinhong Mixed A has a year-to-date return of -22.11%, completely losing last year’s luster.

Betting on robotics: Both the hero of doubling and the villain of drawdown

All of this is closely related to its three fund managers since its inception—each of the three fund managers ranked in the bottom tier of their category during their tenure.

The first fund manager, Fu Jian, served a short term with mediocre performance; the second fund manager, Wen Chenyu, incurred losses over 20% during his tenure, establishing a low tone for the fund; the current fund manager, Li Chaoyu, has been in charge since November 2020 and has incurred a loss of 27.27%, trailing the performance benchmark by over 30 percentage points.

Public data shows that Li Chaoyu graduated with a bachelor’s degree from the Mathematics Department of Nanjing University and a master’s degree in statistics from George Washington University in the United States. He has worked at Jianxin Wealth, Ding Tian Investment, and Xinhua Fund, joining Founder Fubon Fund in September 2020. Currently, he only manages Founder Fubon Xinhong.

From the fourth quarter of 2025, the top ten holdings of Founder Fubon Xinhong were highly concentrated, all focused on the technology growth sector. By the end of the fourth quarter, the fund’s top ten holdings accounted for over 50% of the total portfolio, typical of a “heavy bet” model.

Specifically, the fund’s top ten holdings include Siling Zhichu (7.84%), Zhejiang Rongtai (7.73%), Weichuang Electric (7.58%), and Changying Precision (7.53%), most of which are related to robotics, new energy vehicle components, etc., which were hot tracks in 2025. However, since 2026, as industry policy adjustments and market sentiment cooled, these sectors collectively corrected, directly dragging the fund’s net value down.

More critically, the fund’s position switching remained frequent; in the fourth quarter, seven new heavy stocks were added, yet it failed to keep pace with the market’s main line switch, leading to “missteps”: after the robotics trend receded, it did not timely shift to other sectors with higher prosperity, instead continuing to hold related stocks, exacerbating the drawdown.

Wind data shows that among the fund’s top ten holdings, nine have recorded declines this year, with only Siling Zhichu slightly up by 5.52%. Hengbo Holdings, Zhejiang Rongtai, Lixing Co., Weichuang Electric, and Changying Precision all saw declines exceeding 30%.

Behind the explosive growth in scale: investors who followed the trend at high positions have suffered greatly

The change in scale for Founder Fubon Xinhong is another key dimension to understanding the risks of this fund.

Wind data shows that by the end of 2024, the combined scale of Class A and Class C funds was only 2.28 million yuan, on the edge of being a mini-fund. With the continuous rise in net value in 2025, funds began to flood in on a large scale. By the end of 2025, the combined scale of the fund exceeded 900 million yuan.

The seemingly lively growth in scale actually hides concerns. The fund’s scale achieving a drastic leap in a short time poses a great challenge to the fund manager’s operational flexibility—the high-frequency rotation and heavy betting strategy originally suited for small capital may become difficult to execute after the scale expands, significantly increasing the difficulty of rebalancing.

More critically, if the market continues to decline and investors panic and redeem en masse, the fund may be forced to passively reduce positions at low levels, further dragging down net value, forming a vicious cycle of “redemption-reduction-net value decline.”

The six years of Founder Fubon Xinhong reflect many “dark horse funds”: relying on betting on a single track to achieve short-term surges, ultimately falling into a quagmire of significant drawdowns due to the cooling of popular tracks.

Heavy bets on “gamble” tracks result in dramatic fluctuations in fund net value, with cumulative returns since inception still negative. Does the aggressive style hide compliance risks?

Massive information, precise interpretation, all in the Sina Finance APP

Editor: Wei Zirong