Observation | China's "15th Five-Year Plan" Climate Signals: Providing Certainty for Green Transition Amid Global Energy Turbulence

Ask AI · How does China’s clean technology impact the global emission reduction process?

In March this year, the highly anticipated National People’s Congress reviewed and approved the 14th Five-Year Plan. This blueprint for China’s future development sent key signals domestically and internationally on climate response and energy transition, clearly emphasizing strong support for the development of clean energy and energy security.

As China’s final five-year plan before achieving the “2030 carbon peak” goal, the 14th Five-Year Plan will determine the pace of greenhouse gas emission reductions over the next five years and the policy support for the clean technology industry. These policy directions are not only crucial for China’s green transformation but also vital to the global effort to combat climate change.

The plan explicitly states that between 2026 and 2030, China will strive to reduce CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 17%, promote a peak in coal consumption within the next five years, and achieve an annual replacement of 30 million tons of fossil fuels with renewable energy. The China Daily reports that China will “actively and steadily” move toward these goals.

In response to this significant plan, The Paper (www.thepaper.cn) interviewed several long-term observers of China’s climate and energy sectors from international organizations. They provided in-depth interpretations of the profound significance of the 14th Five-Year Plan for China and the world from a global perspective.

Amid escalating geopolitical conflicts and rising global energy security concerns, China’s 14th Five-Year Plan not only signals domestic transformation but also addresses a larger question: when the world reconsiders energy security, can the green transition still move forward? Will China be able to meet the coal consumption peak, accelerate clean energy substitution, and truly base industrial upgrading on a low-carbon foundation in the next five years? These issues are not only about China’s high-quality development but also will deeply influence the global emission reduction process and the transformation paths of developing countries. In a sense, what the 14th Five-Year Plan writes is not only China’s green coordinates for the next five years but may also serve as a global energy transition compass for the next stage.

On June 25, 2025, along the northern coast of Rongcheng City, Weihai, Shandong, rows of majestic wind turbines turn against the wind. [Visual China stock photo]

What does China’s new carbon intensity target mean?

This year’s government work report from the Two Sessions clearly signals: “During the 14th Five-Year Plan, the cumulative reduction of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP will be about 17%, with about 3.8% reduction in 2026.” This target is explicit and rigidly constrained, continuing China’s firm commitment to reaching the 2030 carbon peak.

Wang Xiaojun, Secretary-General of the Asian Climate Action Network, said, “The 14th Five-Year Plan coincides with China’s final sprint toward the 2030 carbon peak. Achieving this goal is not only about global climate efforts but also about China’s new model of high-quality green and low-carbon development.”

“This firm attitude of ‘strengthening confidence, ensuring peace of mind, focusing, and calming’ injects much-needed focus into the current uncertain international situation and demonstrates a persistent resolve in tackling the climate crisis that threatens human survival. In the turbulent global energy landscape, China’s strategic steadfastness not only sets the tone for domestic high-quality development but also provides the most valuable certainty for global green transformation,” he said.

Analysis by the UK-based Climate and Energy Media “Carbon Brief” indicates that the plan sets a target to reduce China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% from 2026 to 2030 but also adjusts the calculation method for this key climate indicator. Moving from the previous “dual control of energy consumption” (total energy consumption and intensity) to “dual control of carbon emissions” (total emissions and intensity), with corresponding adjustments to accounting boundaries. The plan continues to support China’s clean energy development, reaffirming support for solar, electric vehicles, hydrogen, and new energy storage industries, and emphasizes China’s willingness to lead in global climate governance by becoming a provider of affordable clean energy technologies as “public goods.”

Carbon Brief notes that since March 2024, China’s carbon emissions have remained “stable or declining.” Achieving climate goals remains a key policy driver over the next five years. The latest climate and environment chapter calls for China to “coordinate (economic) development and emission reductions” and to “ensure the timely achievement of the carbon peak.”

The 14th Five-Year Plan reviews the 14th Five-Year Plan, noting that China has achieved a 17.7% reduction in carbon intensity, slightly below the 18% target. The Green Innovation Development Institute (iGDP) points out that influenced by various factors, the carbon intensity reduction in the 14th Five-Year Plan and the 2025 forecast still have gaps, but in terms of energy consumption intensity reduction and renewable energy capacity, China has exceeded expectations, laying a solid foundation for subsequent green transformation.

On July 27, 2025, in Guilin, Guangxi, solar photovoltaic panels are neatly arranged on the rooftops of standard factory buildings in the Pingle County Ertang Town industrial zone, reflecting a deep blue hue under sunlight.

Clean Energy: Key Driver for Emission Reduction and Economic Growth

Yang Muyu, senior analyst at Ember, an energy think tank, told The Paper that the most noteworthy aspect of this new plan is that China’s pursuit of carbon neutrality is not just about adjusting the energy structure but about rebuilding future economic growth and industrial development on a foundation of clean energy.

“In other words, this is not just an energy transition but China’s proposal for ‘comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development.’ Considering China’s large economic scale, complex energy system, current international uncertainties, and multiple domestic development challenges, pushing such large-scale, systemic green transformation is a highly commendable and ambitious project,” Yang said.

The plan continues to call for China to preliminarily establish a “clean, low-carbon, safe, and efficient new energy system” by 2030, and to further increase the installed capacity of wind, solar, hydro, and nuclear power. To fulfill international commitments, the plan sets a goal to increase the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, higher than the slightly below 21.7% in 2025.

It also mentions expanding large-scale clean energy bases, which have been key drivers of solar and wind development over the past five years. These bases include desert-based projects in the northwest and key projects in water-rich provinces in the southwest, integrating solar, wind, and hydropower.

Qin Qi, analyst at the Finnish Center for Energy and Clean Air Research (CREA), notes that the entire plan emphasizes the role of clean energy not only in energy transition and emissions but also in economic growth. It continues to strongly support wind, photovoltaic, hydropower, nuclear, energy storage, smart grids, inter-provincial power transmission, and zero-carbon parks, indicating that the main future energy policy remains focused on enhancing clean energy supply capacity. Building a “new power system” remains a key goal, capable of integrating large amounts of variable wind and solar power, centered on storage, smart grids, cross-provincial power trading, and large-scale transmission, including “vigorous development” of battery storage technology and constructing 100 GW of pumped storage.

Beyond the power system, the plan highlights hydrogen and nuclear fusion as potential new drivers of economic growth. For hydrogen, the focus is on developing supporting infrastructure and integrating hydrogen into industrial, transportation fuels, and energy systems. Nuclear fusion is emphasized as a frontier technology, reflecting China’s ambition to secure a position in the increasingly competitive next-generation energy tech commercialization race.

Qin notes that from the 14th Five-Year Plan, China’s industrial decarbonization and new power system are gradually moving from “goals” to “infrastructure construction.” The plan emphasizes zero-carbon industrial parks, zero-carbon transport corridors, a ten-year doubling of non-fossil energy, new power systems, and vigorous development of new energy storage.

Zero-carbon industrial parks are key to industrial energy decarbonization, including direct supply of clean electricity and green hydrogen to factories. The construction of zero-carbon transport corridors aims to improve fast-charging and battery swapping infrastructure along busy routes, promoting electrification of freight and passenger transport. Last year, an ambitious plan was announced to double charging infrastructure within three years.

“This means that over the next five years, China will not only continue to build new photovoltaic and wind power projects but also push energy transformation deeper: into grid, industrial, transportation, and regional industrial restructuring. This change is significant because it determines whether China can truly convert increased wind and solar capacity into emission reductions and industrial upgrades,” Qin said.

Li Shuo, director of the China Climate Center at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI), observed that the five-year plan does not excessively emphasize “massive support” for clean energy or clean tech industries, consistent with previous expectations. He believes the government aims to regulate to prevent overheating of the manufacturing sector or overinvestment. From a macroeconomic perspective, this signals an important response to the “involution” problem.

iGDP’s analysis points out that the government work report this year highlights five “first mentions” related to green transformation: “future energy,” “green fuels,” “quality improvement, cost reduction, and carbon reduction,” “national low-carbon transition fund,” and “carbon intensity indicators.” The government explicitly calls for “vigorous development of green low-carbon economy,” mentioning “zero-carbon industrial parks,” “zero-carbon factories,” and high-tech, high-value-added green emerging industries to build future competitive advantages.

According to industry media Beijings Electric Power Network, developing “zero-carbon factories and parks” has been a core strategy for many local governments to achieve non-fossil energy goals. The plan also calls for building more such zero-carbon industrial parks. During the 14th Five-Year Plan, China aims to establish about 100 national zero-carbon parks, which will serve as strategic tools to accelerate green transformation, enhance international competitiveness, and respond to trade barriers. Recent research by iGDP shows that these zero-carbon parks, through integrating renewable energy systems, electrification, and industry upgrades focusing on new materials and technologies, are achieving a win-win of economic growth and deep decarbonization.

“Expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms like zero-carbon factories represents an increasingly ‘bottom-up’ and ‘market-oriented’ energy transition, which will ‘leave no room for fossil fuels,’” Yang said.

On December 5, 2025, at the coal terminal in Lianyungang, Jiangsu, trucks are transporting coal.

Promoting coal and oil consumption peak before 2030

Current geopolitical tensions have heightened national and local concerns over energy security, but China’s determination to reverse coal consumption growth remains unchanged. Balancing “development security” and “green low-carbon” will be the focus of the next phase.

The draft outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan explicitly states that “coal and oil consumption will peak between 2026 and 2030,” a phrase appearing for the first time in top-level planning documents. According to Xinhua in February, China’s coal consumption may peak around 2027, and oil around 2026.

Carbon Brief notes that the plan continues to support “clean and efficient utilization of fossil energy” but does not specify a cap or peak timeline for coal consumption. During the 14th Five-Year Plan, China may restart total coal consumption control. The Green Innovation Development Institute points out that “geopolitical tensions have increased energy security concerns at all levels,” adding that this creates uncertainty for coal emission reductions.

Nevertheless, the plan emphasizes upgrading coal-fired power plants, calling for demonstration projects such as biomass co-firing and green ammonia co-firing. Analysts suggest that if coal plants are used flexibly to meet peak demand and compensate for clean energy gaps, such upgrades could reduce utilization rates and emissions. The plan also advocates for “comprehensive low-carbon transformation of coal chemical projects,” which have been major sources of emission growth in the past year. However, coal chemical industries remain a key demand sector for coal mining, with coal-to-oil and gas bases listed as strategic areas to enhance national “security capacity.”

The plan also states that coal-fired boilers in paper, food, and textile industries should be replaced with “clean” energy, aiming for an annual substitution of 30 million tons of coal consumption.

Wang Xiaojun highlighted the situation in Shanxi, the largest coal-producing province. During the 14th Five-Year Plan, Shanxi will face dual constraints of national coal consumption peak and “carbon dual control” policies. A tough transformation awaits, and merely meeting China’s “carbon peak” target is not enough; the province must look beyond coal and find new “non-coal” development paths.

Wang said, “The next five years offer Shanxi a historic opportunity for a stable yet splendid transformation. By moving away from reliance on ‘one coal,’ it can develop multiple industries like green energy, computing power, ecology, agriculture, and health, achieving high-quality growth. Shanxi’s success will contribute to China’s carbon peak and carbon neutrality efforts and serve as an important example for resource-based regions worldwide.”

iGDP further notes that achieving the “dual carbon” goals depends on effective implementation. Top-level targets must translate into concrete local actions. During the 14th Five-Year Plan, China is shifting from energy consumption dual control to comprehensive carbon emission dual control, incorporating it into local government assessments—one of the most transformative governance innovations of the period. Strict enforcement of carbon emission controls will establish accountability mechanisms previously absent in energy intensity indicators.

How will China participate in global climate governance over the next five years?

Meanwhile, clean energy technologies continue to play a vital role in China’s economic upgrading, with several “new energy” sectors identified as key industries. These include intelligent electric vehicles, “new types of solar cells,” new energy storage, hydrogen, and nuclear fusion.

Li Shuo states, “China’s development of clean technologies, rather than traditional administrative climate controls, is increasingly becoming the main driver of emission reductions.” He adds that strengthening China’s clean energy industry means “China’s economic development is becoming more closely integrated with its climate goals.”

Qin Qi believes that China is likely to remain the world’s most significant source of energy transition in the next five years. As the largest energy consumer and emitter, and the biggest producer of clean tech, China will continue to influence global costs, supply chains, and expansion of clean energy through its industrial scale, manufacturing capacity, and infrastructure investments.

“From the plan, we see China’s intention to play a role in global climate governance and to provide affordable clean energy technologies as a public good to other countries. China’s participation is not based on aggressive targets but mainly through technology supply, infrastructure, and standards export. However, if China can establish clearer pathways for phasing out fossil fuels in the next five years, it will enhance its international climate credibility and leadership,” she said.

Qin further notes that, given current conflicts in the Middle East affecting global energy, China will play a more critical and complex role in the global energy transition. Disruptions in shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and other conflicts reinforce China’s strategic thinking: reducing reliance on external oil and gas routes is not only a climate issue but also a matter of national energy security. Under such circumstances, energy transition is likely to become a security-driven shift, with new energy, electrification, green fuels, and other clean energy technologies seen as means to reduce oil and gas import vulnerabilities and enhance strategic resilience. China will push more firmly for replacing fossil fuels, especially in power systems, industrial heat, transportation electrification, and synthetic fuels. Meanwhile, China’s transition model may serve as a more practical example for other developing countries, expanding domestic clean energy supply, reducing import dependence, and developing manufacturing and infrastructure to achieve security, growth, and emission reduction simultaneously.

Yang Muyu also points out that the current Middle East situation reminds the world that the global energy system remains highly dependent on fossil fuel trade, often concentrated in geopolitically sensitive regions. For many Asian economies, this means economic development is still largely constrained by external energy supply security. In this context, energy transition is not just a climate issue but increasingly an economic security and development strategy.

China is gradually decoupling its strategic reliance on fossil energy by promoting cleaner development. On one hand, China is accelerating the construction of a new power system centered on wind and solar. On the other, it is promoting industrial electrification, green fuels, and zero-carbon industrial parks, attempting to base future industrial growth on clean energy. From a global perspective, Yang suggests China’s energy transition could serve as a “ladder” for many developing countries, helping them advance their own decarbonization.

This “ladder” is first reflected in affordability. With its large industrial base and strong manufacturing capacity, China has significantly reduced costs for solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles, enabling many developing Asian countries to bypass high barriers and more smoothly deploy large-scale clean energy.

Second, it is a “ladder” for learning. As the world’s largest and most complex energy and industrial system operator, China is rapidly advancing green transformation while maintaining system stability. The experience and lessons gained are valuable references for Southeast Asia and other fast-growing economies.

More fundamentally, China is opening up new possibilities. As a country that once relied heavily on fossil fuels for industrialization, China could have continued along the old path, but now it is actively exploring new models like clean electrification and zero-carbon industrial parks, reshaping its industrial economy. This offers many Asian countries a broader vision of future development—where deeper industrialization and climate goals are not necessarily at odds but can be pursued in parallel.

“If these explorations succeed, they could not only transform China’s development model but also provide a new reference for other developing countries, especially in Asia—achieving deep energy system transformation while maintaining economic growth and industrialization, reducing dependence on geopolitically sensitive fossil fuel supply chains,” he said.